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GUBERNATORIAL AGENDA
SETTING AND DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH
Laura van Assendelft,Mary Baldwin College
Since World War II, party control of the Presidency , the
Senate, and the House has been divided a total of 28 years. Despite the
magnitude and persistence of this phenomenon, there is little agreement
among researcher s about the impact of divided government on the
American political system. Ginsberg and Shefter argue that divided
government at the national level .produces institutional warfare . Each
party attempts to strengthen the institution it commands and to weaken
the institution controlled by the opposition.
This political pattern undermines the governing capacities
of the nation' s institutions, diminishing the ability of
America 's government to manage domestic and foreign
affairs, and contributing to the erosion of the nation's
international political and economic standing. 1

On the othe r hand , Mayhew argues that party control of the presidency
and Congress does not really matter, because , in the end, just as much
tnajor legislation is passed under divided or unified government. 2
In attempting to solve this puzzle, this study will examine
divided government from a new perspective. The studies by Ginsberg
and Sbefter and Mayhew are focused on the president and Congress.
But the phenomenon of divided government also occurs in the states.
Over the last five decades , divided government has increased at the
state level to where it bas become the norm. 3 Whereas in 1946
divided government occurred in fewer than 15 % of the states , today 30
states have divided government. This study turns to governors and
state legislatures for additional clues. Perhaps more general forces are
at work and theories at the national level may be expanded to explain
similar patterns found at the state level.
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Prior research has also focused on the impact of divided
government on legislative outcomes. This study begins with a brief
review of the methods and results of previous research, while testing
similar hypotheses at the state level. However, quantitative measures
of legislative outcomes, such as the number of bills passed, may
obscure the real impact of divided government. In order to look more
closely at the impact of divided government, this study will look further
back in the policy process to agenda setting. Through the use of
in-depth interviews with governors, legislators, and staff members in
four case studies, perhaps the impact of divided government will
become more visible.
The states selected for analysis are Georgia, Tennessee,
Mississippi, and South Carolina.
Table 1 summarizes tµe main
differences between the four states. The four cases were selected to

Table 1: Party Control and Gubernatorial Experience in the Selected Case Studies
Party Control

Governor's Experience

Zell Miller (D)
(elected 1990)

unified

professional politician

Tennessee

Ned McWherter (D)
(elected 1986)

unified

professional politician

Mississippi

Kirk Fordice (R)
(elected 1991)

divided

amateur politician

South Carolina

Carroll Campbell (R)
(elected 1986)

divided

professional politician

State

Governor

Georgia

Source : Almanac of Amer ican Politics, 1994.

30 I The Journal of Political Sdence

GubernatorialAgenda
allow comparisons between the prior political experience of governors
and political party control, while holding constant as many additional
factors that affect policymaking as possible. The analysis includes two
states with divided government versus two states with unified
government, as well as an amateur governor versus three professional
governors . In addition, all four states are located in the South and are
comparable in terms of socioeconomic factors, gubernatorial powers,
and legislative professionalism. 4
The distinction between amateurs and professionals is
important because amateurs tend to have different motivations for
public service, and, as a result, tend to use different strategies while in
office. An amateur is defined as one who has little or no prior political
experience. While Zell Miller (D-GA), Ned McWherter (D-TN), and
Carroll Campbell (R-SC) have each made a career out of politics, Kirk
Fordice (R-MS) was elected to office with virtually no prior political
experience. 5 The prior experience of the governors also influences
their style of leadership. Rosenthal describes governors as "legislative"
or "executive" in nature.
Governors of the former type speak the language of the
legislature, emphasizing one-on-one dealings, personal
relationships, and the building of consensus. Governors of
the latter type speak a different language. They remain
more aloof from day-to-day workings of the legislature;
personal relationships count less for them; and they are
more inclined to stand up for principle and take a
confrontational approach .6

The type of experience governors have should help to explain whether
governors are executive or legislative in nature .
The underlying assumption of this study is that divided
government has an impact on the strategies of agenda setting used by
governors. In divided government, a governor does not have the same
resources, such as party support, that a governor under unified
government has as an advantage. According to Light's study of
presidential agenda setting, party support in Congress is the most
critical factor in agenda setting because it is a resource that does not
decline as rapidly as public support over the course of a president's
Volume 23, 1995 \ 31
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term in office. When the president represents the majority party, even
when he is down in the polls, there is still a base of party support to
count on. According to Light, "Though congressional support does not
guarantee victories on crucial votes, the president and the staff certainly
believe that such support is a more consistent advantage than is public
approval. "7 Public approval and the size of the president's electoral
margin certainly strengthen or weaken the president's capital, but party
support remains the critical factor.
Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout, they all
mean the same thing. The most basic and most important
of all presidential resources is capital. .. And capital is
directly linked to the congressional parties. While there is
little question that bargaining skills can affect both the
composition and success of the domestic agenda, without
the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or
charm can make a difference.8

If Light's theory applies to governors as well as presidents,
then the governor under divided government will develop a different
agenda setting strategy from the governor under unified government.
Under unified government, a governor can make a partisan appeal for
his agenda and primarily work inside the system, provided his party
maintains a majority within the legislature. The strategy has potential
for success as long as the governor does not split his party support by
stressing controversial issues. Lacking party support as a potential
resource, a governor working under divided government must develop
an alternative strategy, such as going public. As long as the governor
can maintain popular support, his agenda will have a kind of legitimacy
that as a governor of the opposite political party of the legislature he
would not ordinarily have .
There are dangers, however, associated with a going public
strategy of leadership . In his study of presidential leadership strategies,
Kernell argues that going public is incompatible with bargaining.
Kernell explains that in going public, issues are oversimplified,
legislators are essentially threatened, little room is left for
compromising, and "the legitimacy of other politicians" is
undermined. 9 In contrast, Rosenthal argues that governors often go
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public in order to facilitate bargaining with the legislature. 10 In the
end, the governor's goal is to influence the legislature; the extent to
which be is confrontational reflects his personality. This study will
examine the styles and strategies of gubernatorial agenda setting in an
attempt to see if divided government influences a governor's decision
to primarily go public or work inside the legislative system.

Quantitative Measures of Divided Government
Researchers have made numerous attempts to measure
quantitatively the impact of divided government. Studies have focused
on the impact of divided government on nominations, treaties, the
occurrence of high publicity investigations, and the use of vetoes. 11
Divided government was found to have little or no impact, except in
the case of the executive veto. The problem that arises with analyzing
vetoes, however, is that the number of times a veto is threatened is not
included. In some cases, it is only necessary to threaten a veto for an
executive to influence legislation. Therefore, the number of actual
vetoes is an incomplete measure of the extent to which the veto power
is exercised.
Other studies have explored the impact of divided government
on legislative productivity. 12
If divided government produces
gridlock, then it is reasonable to expect that fewer bills would be
passed under divided government than under unified government.
Using a rigorous methodology of both contemporary and retrospective
evidence, David Mayhew identified 267 major laws and found that just
as many important laws are passed under divided government (12.8 per
segment) as under unified government (11. 7 per segment). "What does
not emerge .. .is any relation worth crediting between the incidence of
important laws and whether party control was unified or divided." 13
Kelly reexamined Mayhew's data and reduced the sample of
legislation analyzed to only those policies considered both timely and
enduring. Kelly found that divided government does matter. While an
average 8.8 innovative laws passed under unified government, an
average of 6.09 passed under divided government. According to
Kelly's analysis, "about 30% fewer innovative policies are passed in
Congress under divided government than under a united one. "14
Volume 23, 1995 \ 33
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Two problems are raised in relying on legislative productivity as a
measure of the impact of divided government. First, it is difficult to
determine what is important or innovative legislation; different
researchers have based their findings on different samples. Second,
comparisons of legislative outputs have not explored how the demand
for legislation varies over time. In attempting to address these
problems, this study measured the legislative output of different state
legislatures at the same point in time. The advantage of conducting
research at the state level is that unified and divided government may
be compared at the same point in time. Due to difficulties in obtaining
information on large quantities of bills across states, however, the
analysis includes the total number of bills passed without identifying
important or innovative legislation.
Table 2 shows the legislative productivity of divided and
unified government across states from 1990-1991. States with divided

Table 2: Legislative Productivity by Divided or Unified
Government in the States, 1990-1991
1990
Unified Government {20 states)
Average Number of Bills Introduced
Average Number of Bills Enacted
%Enacted

2212.0
481.0
30.9

2048.4
569.2
34 .7

2130.2
525.l
32.8

2280.0
415 .8
31.4

2475.4
437.6
23.8

2377.7
426 .7
27.6

Divided Government (29 states)
Average Number of Bills Introduced
Average Number of Bills Enacted
%Enacted

Source: Book of the States, 1992-1993 Edi ti011. Lexington, Kentucky : Council of State
Governments and The A lmanac of American Politics, 1990. Washington, D.C. : National Journal.
Note : The data includes regular sessions only. Nebraska is not included (nonpartisan legislature).
The nwnber of bills introduced is the combined total of both chambers of the state legislature .
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government produced an average of 19 % fewer bills than states with
unified government. However, in terms of the number of bills passed
as a percentage of the number of bills introduced, the difference was
only 0.5% in 1990 and approximately 11 % in 1991. There appears to
be no consistent pattern suggesting an impact of divided government on
legislative productivity at the state level.
An analysis of legislative productivity in the four states
selected as case studies from 1945-1993 produced similar findings. As
shown in Table 3, the number of bills passed during divided
government was significantly less than during unified government in
two states, Tennessee and Mississippi. However, more legislation was
produced during divided government than during unified government
in South Carolina. (Georgia has only experienced unified government).
Table 3: The Average Number of Bills Passed Per Year During
Divided and Unified Government By State, 1946-1992

Unified Government

Divided .Government

609
[45)

[O]

Tenne ssee

358
[33)

449
[12)

Mississi ppi

552
[43)

605
[2]

South Carolina

632
[35)

404
[10)

537.75

364.50

Georgia

Averag e

0 Number of Years
Source: The Book of the States, 1945-1993 Editions . Lexington, Kentucky:
Council of State Governments.
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A closer examination of the data demonstrated that when the
period of divided government occurred explained why these patte rns
occurred. As illustrated in Figure 1, legislative pro ductivity has
gradually increased over time in Georgia and Tennessee, whereas in
Mississippi and South Carolina, legislative productivity reached a peak
in the 1970s, dropped significantly, and then leveled out. The trends
in legislative productivity in each state have developed irrespective of
divided or unified government.
An analysis of vetoes at the state level also prod uced
inconsistent results . As Table 4 shows, governors in states with unified
government vetoed 25 % fewer bills than governors in states with
unified government in 1990. However, in 1991, governors in states
with unified government vetoed 11 % more bills than governors in states
with divided government. In a comparison of the four govern ors
selected as case studies, the two governors from divided governm ent
states, Ford.ice (R-MS) and Campbell (R-SC), vetoed an average of
17 % more bills than the governors from unified government states,
Miller (D-GA) and McWherter (D-TN).
Quantitative measures of legislative outcomes are proble matic
in determining whether or not divided government has an impact
because they do not take into account the numerous factors that have
influenced policymaking at different stages in the process. To explore
the process more closely, this study has used a qualitative appro ach
focused on agenda setting, the earliest formal stage of the policym aking
process. How agenda setting takes place defines the opportunities for
success in terms of legislative outcomes. The analysis of agenda
setting reveals patterns of an impact of divided government on the
strategies that governors use.

Gubernatorial Agenda Setting and Divided Government
In each of the four case studies, the following factors were
examined: 1) the recent political history of the state (in order to help
frame the political context in which the agenda setting process takes
place) , 2) the personal background of the governor, including his prior
experience, style, and political philosophy, and 3) political factors,
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Table 4: The Average Number of Vetoes Per Year By
Divided or Unified Government in All States, 1990-1991
Unified Government

Divided Government

20

28

1990

21.22

28.33

1991

28.27

25

Average

24.75

26.67

Number of States

Note : States not included are Nebraska (nonpartisan legislature) and
North Carolina (no veto power) .
Source : The Book of the States, 1945-1993 Editions . Lexington , Kentucky :
Council of State Governments .

including the electoral outcomes, the governor's party support, his
relationship with the legislature, and his public support. All unattributed
quotes are taken from interviews conducted by the author during the
spring of 1994. This paper summarizes the findings of this research,
linking personal and political factors in explaining each governor's
agenda setting strategy.
38 / The Jouf7U!-lof Political Science
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Zell Miller : The Hands-On Governor

Miller selects issues generally based on a realistic sense of
what can and cannot be accomplished publicly and in the
General Assembly.
His knowledge of the General
Assembly is a big factor here . Sometimes if you know you
are going to do something that does not naturally coincide
with the interests of some key committee, or the legislative
leadership , you need to make a little more public noise. It
is almost always based on a very painstaking member by
member assessment of where key legislators are likely to
be and what buttons to push .
-Ed Kilgore, policy advisor to the governor

Zell Miller has enjoyed having party support as an important
source of political capital. As a professional politician, he knows how
to work the legislative process as an insider. He is a goal-oriented,
hands-on governor. Miller understands how to build a consensus,
although his style is geared towards confrontation.
In terms of selecting the items on his agenda, both major
issues and specific policy alternatives, Miller is pragmatic. As Frank
Bates, a policy advisor to the governor, explained,
We try to do our homework and see which way the wind
is blowing on a particular issue. If people are interested in
crime, we do a poll to see what people want. We certainly
want to give the people what they want .

Miller is good at selecting policy alternatives that are popular
among the public . Staff members explained that by picking issues that
are popular with constituents, Miller has increased his support in the
legislature. For example , in 1994 Miller decided to push "Two strikes
and you're out," as opposed to the nationally proposed "Three strikes
and you're out , " policy for sentencing violent offenders on his 1994
agenda. According to Rick Dent , the governor's press secretary,
Volume 23, 1995 \ 39
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It is a nice little baseball analogy and everyone can
understand it. That subject came up, and the governor
said, and this is where he really thinks like real people, he
said, 'You know, how do you explain that you are going to
give a violent criminal three times to rape somebody? How
do you justify giving somebody three times to molest
children? I was raised by my mom who said everyone is
entitled to a second chance, everybody makes mistakes, but
not a third .'

Miller tries to maximize success by developing his agenda
incrementally. For example, on the lottery issue, achieving success
meant postponing until 1992 the enabling legislation that would
determine how the lottery would be run and how the money would be
spent. Miller did not want to risk losing the lottery in a battle over
how the funds would be used. In his first legislative session, the
highest priority on his agenda was a constitutional amendment allowing
the voters to decide whether or not there should be a Georgia lottery.
As Ed Kilgore, a policy advisor to the governor , explained, "To a large
extent, what he does this year has been predetermined by what he has
done in previous years." Another example includes Miller ' s campaign
pledge to build boot camps for nonviolent offenders. As Kilgore
explained ,
If you '100k at that over his entire four years you
will see a consistent pattern. Establishing boot camps made
it possible this year to go after tougher mandatory sentences
for the most violent repeat offenders. We've adopted two
strikes and you're out. It all kind of fits together-ending
the early release program, building prisons, providing boot
camps, and then having the prison space available.

Another important part of Miller's strategy has been to
prioritize his issues. As Bates, a policy advisor to the governor,
explained,
There are a lot of issues that he has. You try to
manage three or four key issues and try to do them well.
If you take on a whole host of issues, you can't manage
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them properly . He goes through a selection process.
Whicb is most important? Which will bring more
comfort to the people of this state? What do the people
want most? We try to push those particular issues. He has
learned to take on issues that are most important to the
people of this state and do them well, instead of taking on
a whole armful and not being able to manage them as well.
As journalist Tom Baxter explained, "In terms of what he will
go to the wall for, you only have to look at legislative records to see
that he has really focused on a few things."
According to
Representative Bob Holmes (D),

He's a master at agenda setting. He has a knack of taking
one or two issues that are really going to be his primary
thrust and that's what he tends to concentrate on, which I
think is a much more effective way than to have a
Christmas list, so to speak, of a dozen different issues.
That way, on an education issue like the lottery, he can
put more capital working to try to get that and maybe one
or two other issues. So I would say he is very good at
that; in focusing his efforts he's able to accomplish a great
deal more .

Once Miller decides what he wants to do, he is forceful about
getting what he wants. As Steve Wrigley, the governor's executive
secretary, described, "He lays it down very clearly, 'This is my
agenda, this is what I want, and this is how I want you to help me do
it.'" The governor appears to have a great deal of influence, and he
understands the legislative process. As Wrigley explained,
The legislative body has 236 members, and you might have
that many separate agendas . If the chief executive strikes
off in a direction that makes sense from a policy
standpoint-if it is politically popular, makes sense to the
members, and it's clear what he is trying to achieve-then
he '11 get it. Miller understands that it is really a
communication issue.

Volume 23, 1995 \ 41
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Miller is very effective at "standing tall," providing leadership
and direction to the legislature.
According to Representative Bob Holmes (D), Miller "is very
aggressive and very assertive. I bate to say this, but he sort of has a
'take no prisoners' kind of attitude. To a certain extent he is almost
too inflexible."
For example, Miller was very confrontational in
proposing to change the state flag. As Frank Bates, a policy advisor
to the governor, explained, "If he always tried to do what was
politically correct, he would not have touched trying to change the
flag." Miller bad a strategic reason for pursuing the flag issue. Not
only was he appealing to a national audience, but he used the flag issue
on the one band to balance welfare reform on the other.
As
Representative Bob Holmes explained, "I think he wanted to show
conservatives that he was willing to do something on welfare reform,
and he wanted to show liberals that he wanted to do something in terms
of a social issue like the flag."
According to journalist Tom Baxter, "He probably hurt himself
politically more than he thought he would." Miller pushed the issue in
1993, admitted that he bad failed, and moved on to other issues. He
remained committed to the idea of changing the state flag; however,
other priorities needed his attention. In addition to the flag, Miller has
bad to fight for DUI legislation and welfare reform. As Cynthia
Wright, legal counsel to the governor, explained, Miller has pushed
some tough issues, and "even though we've bad a Democratic majority
and we've enjoyed that, it is not a bed of roses around here."
Miller governs using a carrot and a stick, and as party
chairman, there are a number of sources of leverage that he can use
over legislators. As a professional politician, Miller knows when to be
confrontational without risking his chances of success. The tremendous
amount of party support that he has, combined with his political skills
and experience, help to explain his "inside" strategy and his
confrontational style. In sum, the presence of unified government has
been an advantage for Miller.
Ned McWherter: The Speaker as Governor
To understand McWherter you need to begin by
understanding that he is a product of the legislature.
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Because he was a product of the legislature, he brought to
the governor's office a belief that the executive branch
should establish a small number of priorities, work to
implement those priorities, and for the most part leave the
remainder of the issues to the legislature without the
governor's interference .
-Billy Stair, executive assistant for policy and planning

Ned McWberter's basic philosophy is that a governor should
focus on a few things and do them well. While there are legislators
who probably want the governor to take on more issues, McWherter
has tried to maintain his focus. As Billy Stair, the governor's executive
assistant for policy and planning, explained,
We don't go down there and take a position on every bill.
There are a whole range of issues like whether you can
have an open beer in a car, or whether people can legally
be permitted to carry guns, or smoking in government
offices. We don't care about those issues because they do
not, in our opinion, relate to that big picture of economic
development in Tennessee. We let the legislature do their
thing, and they've been supportive of letting the governor
do his thing. It's worked .

McWherter chose to focus on a limited number of priorities,
because, as he explained, "If you don't prioritize your issues, you'll
end up trying to do everything and won't accomplish a great deal." As
Betty Haynes, the governor ' s chief administrative officer, described,
"Governor McWberter does not like to get sidetracked." In describing
his philosophy, McWherter explained,
I govern with my eyes focused on the basic needs of
Tennesseans, to improve the quality of life through a better
education and a health care system, and to get people jobs .
I keep my target out there in front of me all of the time.
I've got two philosophies : plan your work, and work your
plan.
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McWberter's style is inclusive; he works with the legislature
in developing his agenda. He likes to "ease along," slowly developing
a consensus on each issue. He keeps legislators informed, meeting
one-on-one with them, and bouncing ideas around to build a consensus
before he takes a public stand.
He is the classic example of
Rosenthal's "legislative" governor.
Once McWberter formally
proposes an initiative, be defers to the legislature , asking legislators to
refine and perfect his proposal. As Representative H. E. Bittle (R)
described McWberter's strategy, "He's left a lot of the major decisions
up to the legislature. Like education reform. He endorsed it and
promoted it. But the package he presented to us, we changed and
improved, with his encouragement." Ken Renner , the governor's press
secretary, explained, "We had to do certain things to build consensus.
When we began talking about education reform, we watered a lot of the
ideas on it to come from the ground up. " As David Gregory , the
governor's director of legislative affairs, described the process,

It was a coalition type deal where you had Republicans and
Democrats alike in working hard . They took the bill that
we introduced in the legislature, hammered out amendment
and amendment, worked on it this way and that and truly
made it a better bill than we had put in. But it was able to
pass in a way that people felt like they had a chance to
participate . Everybody was happy .

McWberter was able to build a consensus by developing the
issue incrementally. As Renner explained, "We wanted to improve
teacher salaries early on, realizing that he had to do that before we
could get the teachers' approval for other improvements outside of
salaries." Likewise, McWberter ensured that more prisons were built
before proposing "Three Strikes and You're Out" in 1994. So in
selecting specific policy alternatives, McWberter has been pragmatic .
Overall, McWberter's strategy has been to maximize his
strengths by focusing on the legislature. In setting the agenda, his
instinct has always been to go to the legislature before going to the
public . As Ken Renner , the governor's press secretary explained,
44 / The Journal of Political Science
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My instinct is to get a lot of public support first before
going to the legislature; his instinct is the exact opposite.
He will go directly to them. Often on a major policy, like
education reform or health care reform, we will schedule
a speech to the legislature to try to set the tone for
the issue and how it is framed. Then we will follow with
a lot of information to the legislature and to the media. His
style has always been to go first to the legislature.

As Representative H. E. Bittle (R) explained, "He's used the legislature
because he understands how it works. He knows how to reach
consensus. I think his understanding of the system and working the
system to the maximum to his advantage have served him well." Jim
Kennedy, deputy to the governor, agreed: "He is a consensus builder .
You can sail against the wind, but it ~oesn't really work that way."
McWherter's prior experience as Speaker of the House for 14
years has aided him tremendously in his role as consensus builder. Not
only did he acquire a unique perspective on the long term development
of the issues, but he understands who the major players are .
McWherter also has a number of long-time friends in the legislature,
and many of the current leaders were put in place when McWherter
was in the legislature. As a professional politician, McWherter is
skilled at bringing together opposing factions from both parties.
Unified government has been an advantage for McWherter.
He hasenjoyed the security of a substantial amount of support from his
party, which has also allowed him to maximize his strengths.
According to Ken Renner, the governor's press secretary,
Management is really his strong suit. He knows the
numbers, he knows the details, he's been in state
government so long that he can sit down with a
commissioner and ask him not only how a program is
doing, but how Joe is doing in that program . His strong
suit isn't going on television and giving great speeches and
that kind of thing. What we have tried to do is to
maximize his strengths, to find out what he does best and
build his administration or style around doing what he does
best. You can't completely hide from the public and be a
manager down in the bowels of state government
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A long time back on first grade report cards there was a
little spot on the back, 'he plays well with other children.'
Well, when you get in politics, and in a leadership position,
that remark is the first thing-lesson 101- in working
government to an ultimate end. Governor Fordice actually
hired someone to help him with 101, because of his
completely different background. So he has changed . He
was just too bold; he made remarks to start with that were
unnecessary . After he toned that down, he was able to
work better with the legislature .

Fordice was reluctant to become involved in the legislative
process. He outlined hls agenda in hls state of the state address and
expected the legislators to come up with bills that reflected hls agenda.
As Jody Tidwell, administrative assistant to the lieutenant governor,
described Fordice 's style, "He leads by example. He's not a leader
who gets down there and works with you; he's a man that leads by
example and with a strong hand." Geoffrey Yoste, policy advisor to
the governor, agreed: "He's kind of adversarial at times. 'This is how
we're going to do this and thls is how it is going to be.' He leads by
example. He proposes and the legislature disposes." For the most
part, Fordice chose to communicate with the legislature through hls
staff, outlining goals but leaving the legislative process to the
legislators. Fordice is a good example of Rosenthal's "executive"
governor. He likes to keep hls relationshlps professional and prefers
not to socialize with legislators. "He's there if they want to talk
substance with rum. He wants to have a good relationshlp, but it's all
business as opposed to just public relations," explained Geoffrey Yoste,
a policy advisor to the governor.
As a political amateur, Fordice needed time to develop an
effective strategy. According to Andy Taggart, the governor's chlef
of staff,
He [Fordice] saw that simply presenting to the legislature
what made perfect common sense to him and seemed to
reflect the mandate of the voters wa~ not enough. We had
legislators come into the governor's office waving 50 to 70
pink slips of people who'd called. Those people didn't just
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somewhere and expect to be successful, but you have to
maximize your own ability to do those things that you do
well.

McWherter is a professional politician who understands the
importance of personal relations in the legislative process. He goes out
of his way to make the legislature an equal partner with the governor.
Clearly, unified government has been an important source of political
capital for the governor, contributing to his good relationship with the
legislature . As a product of the legislature, he knows how to work the
system and to build consensus. He keeps the legislature informed and
always takes his recommendations to the legislature before taking a
public stand. He has been inclusive and accessible in his style as a
"legislative" governor. As a result of unified government, McWherter
was able to capitalize on the skills he developed as Speaker in
developing an agenda setting strategy that focused primarily on the
legislature .

KirkFordice: The Chief Executive Officer as Governor
After six months Pordice got his 'sea legs.' Being a CEO
of a state government and being a CEO of a private
business are very different things. In his business he could
say to one 'Go' and he went and to another 'Come' and she
came. But government doesn't work that way. The give
and take of the legislative process has caused him to grow
immensely.
-Andy Taggart, chief of staff

Lacking prior political experience, as governor Kirk Fordice
has drawn from what he learned in the business world. He entere d
office intending to run the state of Mississippi like a business.
However, he soon realized that a CEO of state government is very
different from a CEO of a business. Senator Walter Graham (D) used
the analogy of a first grade report card to grade Fordice's performance:
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rise up one day and decide to call their legislator. There
was a hard network in place. Our goal is to have a true
grass roots organization so that when a [Fordice-supported]
bill is two days away from a vote next February, we can
call our 20 people, who then call their chairmen , who then
call their six or eight or ten precinct chairmen . 15

Fordice realized that by going public, he could generate
support for his agenda that would give him influence in the legislature.
TEAMississippi, announced at the Neshoba County Fair in 1992,
became the grassroots organization envisioned by the Fordice
administration.
The TEAMississippi organization set up a 1-800 number for
citizens to call and receive information on who their legislators are,
where to reach them , when the legislature is in session, and what issues
are being debated. In addition, TEAMississippi provides a phone tree
that can be activated in support of the governor's bills . The strategy
was developed as a way to tap into the governor ' s public support, since
Fordice did not feel that the media was a tool that he could rely on.
As John Arledge , Fordice's Director of Communications, explained,
"We have a very liberal newspaper here in Jackson and there has been
a lot of tension between the governor 's office and this paper. So we
can't exactly say we have some media buddies that are helping us push
the governor's agenda."
TEAMississippi provided a means to translate Fordice's public
support into political capital . After announcing TEAMississippi in
August of 1992, Fordice initially recruited about 7,000 people. By the
1994 legislative session , there were more than 15,000 registered
members. Once the TEAMississippi agenda is announced in August,
the list is narrowed to a few issues that become the governor's
priorities. As Andy Taggart, the governor ' s chief of staff, explained,
We could not have realistically pursued 12 major
subject areas and the three or four sub-items in each of
those areas over the course of a 90 day session.
We couldn't have devoted the resources , nor would we
have given appropriat e attention to the issues that were
most important to us. So we broke the TEAMississippi
agenda down into a much more practical listing so that the
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governor could focus on three key issues each year.and
that 's what we identified in the state of the state address.

Fordice has learned that by focusing his agenda, he can maximize his
potential for success. As John Arledge, the governor's director of
communications, explained, "By announcing the agenda six months in
advance of the legislative session, you really have time to work on it."
Despite his minority party status as governor , staff members
insisted that Fordice does not consider what the legislature is likely to
pass when he decides on what to focus. According to John Arledge,
the governor ' s director of communications, "It's not a big factor in his
decisionmaking whether the legislature is for it or against something .
And that is really part of his appeal; he' s a very obstinate man. " For
example, as Arledge explained , "We've pushed term limits all three
times. We don't need any political feelers to tell us that the legislature
will not pass term limits , but nonetheless, the governor sees that as a
high prio rity and will continue to push on it. " Jeanne Forrester, a
policy advisor to the governor, said that Fordice "does not consider the
legislature's reaction, and I would say that there are a number of issues
we end up fighting for. But the staff as a whole has gotten a lot more
savvy about what works to move our agenda."
As a reporter
explained, "Fordice never would have gone with a tax cut , for
example, if he wanted to pick something easy to pass . He knows what
he wants, and he goes for it."
Fordice is straightforward about what he wants ; he tries to
keep legislators informed and to be accessible to them. He is
committed and passionate about his ideas, but he does not tend to invest
himself personally in pushing his agenda through the legislature. He
becomes involved when he feels it is critically necessary; otherwise, he
delegates the job to his legislative staff . The problem with Fordice ' s
strategy, however , is that TEAMississippi is a set of very specific
policy alternatives. For example, Fordice does not try to build support
to "do something" in the area of education. He outlines proposals for
local option public school choice , performance pay for teachers , and
mandatory caps on administrative spending . In all five or six issue
areas he addresses each year through TEAMississippi, he does not paint
the big picture; he lays down the specific policy alternatives that he
supports. While it is important that Fordice outlines his priorities,
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by committing to specific alternatives at the agenda setting stage, not
much room is left for compromise during later stages of the legislative
process. Fordice demonstrates the dangers of what Kernell terms
"posturing."
Rosenthal describes the governors who are "executive types,"
explaining that "they stand on principle and are not reluctant to scrap
with the legislature or go over the head of the legislature to the press
and people·. "16 Lacking party support as a resource and frustrated
after his first few months in office, Fordice went over the heads of
legislators to make a direct appeal to the people for support. Through
the establishment of TEAMississippi he developed a mechanism for
tapping into his public support and articulating his agenda. As an
amateur, Fordice has had to learn through trial and error how to deal
with a legislature controlled by the opposite party . Although lie could
potentially draw from a broader, ideological base of support, Fordice
is not the type of governor who tries to build coalitions through
constant compromise.
Fordice is strong in his convictions and
confrontational in his approach . In this case, the presence of divided
government seems to have exacerbated the naturally adversarial
relationship between the governor and the legislature in Mississippi.
Carroll Campbell: The Salesman as Governor
He's always looking for what fits his ideological agenda .
That's probably the first screening . What does he, as a
conservative Republican, need to say about a particular
issue. Then he asks, well, is that good policy? Does it
make sense? Can we afford it? How is it going to be
received in the legislature and in the general public? A lot
of it is trying to find the trains that are already moving . It
is not that often that we originate an issue out of this
office; normally it is something that has been bubbling up
and is already being talked about. We try to figure out if
it is important enough for him to include in his agenda.
Cost is always a big consideration , but so is the public's
perception . Once he says there is an issue that he thinks is
important, we do a lot of research to figure out what the
legislative leadership thinks about it, whether we are likely
to get anywhere with it, what the press is going to say, all

50 I The Journal of Political Science

GubernatorialAgenda
those kinds of things .
Janice Trawick, executive advisor for education

As a professional politician Carroll Campbell understands the
limits of his role in agenda setting and has attempted to select issues
and focus on priorities that maximize his success. As governor,
Campbell has demonstrated an acute awareness of and sensitivity to
politic al capital and how it is expended. Campbell believed that the
issues he put on his agenda early in his term would define the limits of
what he could do later in his term. As Tucker Eskew, the governor's
press secretary, explained,
We started out with a narrow election victory in 1986 and
a Republican governor going into a traditionally Democratic
legislature . There was a sense that there was a need to
develop early political capital, focusing in the agenda and
establishing some clear points of reference for people to say
yes, Carroll Campbell is a go-getter, an achiever.

For example, Campbell chose to focus on economic
development because he could achieve success without necessarily
going through the legislature. He used his experience as a successful
businessman to become South Carolina's salesman. The strategy
worked. As Graham Tew, a policy advisor to the governor, explained,
"We were lucky in that he was able to deliver some good things in
economic development, which gave him credibility."
As Eskew
elaborated,
We bad a number of high-profile announcements of
corporate locations and new investments into the state early
in the first six to eight months in 1987-projects that the
governor got involved with and helped bring to fruition
very quickly. He bad campaigned largely on the issues of
economic competitiveness and bow South Carolina needed
to rewrite its tax code, reconsider its incentives, and focus
more on diversification of our economy . He was able to
follow up on that pledge in the campaign with early
victories in economic development.

Volume 23, 1995 \ 51

Laura van Assendelft
While there were some economic development initiatives that
required legislation, Campbell's energies were focused on recruitment
of industry. As Eskew explained, "We bad the legislature involved,
but the higher profile activity of going out and recruiting industry and
traveling the globe was seen as Carroll Campbell's activity." Graham
Tew, a policy advisor to the governor, explained that a conscious
decision was made not to define the governor's success in terms of
legislation:
We don't define ourselves simply by how much legislation
we pass . We have had almost $20 billion of new
investment in the state since Carroll Campbell became
governor. That has been because he travels all around the
county, all around the world, all through the state, tallcing
expansion and bringing in new companies.

By placing less emphasis on legislative achievements,
Campbell attempted to prevent the legislature from defining whether he
was successful or not. And by winning early successes in economic
development, Campbell accrued capital that allowed him to expand his
agenda.
In choosing his priorities, Campbell tries to focus on
substantive issues that will have the most impact on the future of South
Carolina. As Campbell explained,
I have expended capital on the things that I thought were
important more from a 'macro ' standpoint of the future of
the state as opposed to the 'micro' type of issue where it
might involve an individual appointment or something like
that. Most of them are broader issues that have to do with
the whole state, not singular issues that are very isolated or
controversial.

According to Campbell, political capital is wasted on symbolic issues.
For example, according to Mark Elam, the governor's senior executive
legal counsel, Campbell would never touch an issue such as the
changing the Confederate flag. As Campbell explained,
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Sometimes the hottest issue that you find is the most
controversial thing-a symbolic issue instead of a
substantive issue. And people get all jacked up over
symbolism, but I don't burn a lot of capital on symbolism.
I get criticized sometimes for it. I could take on every
symbolic fight that comes along, but in the end, you don't
accomplish anything one way or another . I want to take on
a substantive fight that really is going to mean something.

Campbell becomes involved only on the issues of major
importance to him, a strategy that maximizes his political capital within
the legislature. As William Gunn, a policy advisor to the governor,
explained,
The legislarure recognizes that Carroll Campbell is not an
individual who latches on to every issue and tries to push
through every microscopic bill that goes across but be does
become energetic about the important initiatives that are the
framework of what be wants to do in bis administration.

In Representative H. Howell Clybome's (R) description, "Campbell

tends to move in bold, reform-oriented steps, and it is so
comprehensive that it tends to span years." Campbell has been very
careful to focus his energies behind a manageable set of priorities,
maximizing his resources in order to obtain success on the issues that
he considers most important.
Campbell's strategy also involves going public. Because of
divided government, party support in the legislature is insufficient to
guarantee acceptance of Campbell's agenda. To gain additional
influence and sell his agenda, Campbell has taken his message to the
public. Campbell is an effective public speaker, a very polished and
professional politician who understands the benefits of going public.
Graham Tew, a policy advisor to the governor, explained how, saying,
We always said we would go over the beads and go
straight to the people, and we did that in a number of
ways-the governor moving around the state and speaking
directly to the people, lots of news conferences, lots of
contact-a very, very focused press operation to mold
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public opinion through the press . We had the best
messenger in the state. We understood how to use the tools
we had to communicate what we were about to the public,
and that's how you build political capital. If you are
popular with the public, that translates eventually
back upstairs to the legislators, because they want to do
what their constituents want them to do.

If successful, a going public strategy will generate support within the

legislature. As Representative David Wilkins (R) explained,
He [Campbell) is very articulate and he is good in front of
a camera . He uses those abilities to generate support for
his beliefs and his issues, and that in turn can equate into
support in the general population which legislators feel and
which influences them to support his issues. I think he uses
his ability to speak and his ability to get his message
through the media to become very effective. I think that
has been his most effective tool, probably more so than
his ability to sit down one on one with people and work
things out. He can sell his message to the people, and if
you can do that, you ultimately get what you want.

Campbell is also sensitive to the limitations of a going public
strategy. When he does make an appeal to the public, he does not
criticize the legislature, and he does not lock into a specific policy,
leaving room on stage for legislators to have a part in the show.
Campbell uses a going public strategy to facilitate opportunities for
bargaining and compromise .
Campbell understands the importance of making legislators feel
like they are involved in the process. Campbell knows what he wants,
but he does not try to force his agenda on them. He sets the direction
and then allows the legislature to play a part in the final course. For
example, while education has been on his agenda throughout his
administration, he has framed the issue in terms of general goals and
not specific programs. Thus, a Democratic legislature that had
typically dominated this issue area was still included in the process. As
a Columbia reporter explained, "At the outset he offers what he wants.
He knows where he is willing to draw the line. He doesn't reveal that
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in the beginning, but he knows what he is willing to give up to get
what he wants." Representative H. Howell Clyborne (R) agreed,
explaining that "once Campbel1 decides on what he thinks is the right
thing to do , he goes with it. But he is very good at determining what
the bottom line will be."
Although Campbell has pursued an active agenda consistent
with his conservative philosophy, legislators argue that certainly there
were things Campbell did not even try because of divided government.
Repr esentative Clyborne explained,
There continues to be a very definite philosophical
difference between Democrats and Republicans . That
does affect things . If you have a governor's mansion
controlled by the same party, there's just not that
check there . The effect is probably not quantitative, but it
is a qualitative difference because there are a lot of
perceptions about getting things through and who gets what
passed. So a lot of times you may think about introducing
something , but you know good and well that it is never
going to pass . So to keep from being publicly defeated,
you just don't introduce it. That's what the difference is.
You temper what you put out based on the audience that is
there.

According to Graham Tew, a policy advisor to the governor,
"If we had a Republican majority, we would have done a lot more on
auto insurance reform, tort reform, and things of that nature." Mark
Elam, the governor's senior legal counsel, also described the impact of
divide d government, saying, "Under divided government, you don't get
every thing you want. You have to make more compromises, you have
to be much more cooperative, and it is not easy." Campbell is
extreme ly sensitive to his political capital, and the process by which he
selects issues would suggest that there are issues, or specific policies,
that he chose not to pursue. Campbell is a professional politician who
unders tands the limits of his role and the consequences of his actions.
He care fully selected issues and focused on priorities that would
maximiz e his success. And where he could, he attempted to address
issues nonlegislatively .
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Campbell' s strategy of agenda setting has been a combination
of building capital, focusing his priorities, and using the bully pulpit to
take his message to the public. He strategically chose a limited number
of agenda items early in his term in order to maximize success. At the
outset he is confrontational about the issues he thinks are important, but
he always leaves room for consensus and compromise.
Divided government has had a significant impact on
Campbell's strategy. There was not a strong enough base of party
support for Campbell to rely on, nor did he enter office with an
electoral mandate to pursue a specific agenda. Therefore, Campbell
had to create political capital. Capitalizing on his talents in public
relations, Campbell took his message to the people. And drawing from
his experience as a businessman, he became South Carolina's chief
salesman.
Campbell's success in these nonlegislative activities
combined with his sustained public support ultimately gave his agenda
credibility within the legislature.

Conclusion
By focusing on the state level, this study has tried to expand
our understanding of the impact of divided government. Does divided
government produce gridlock, or is there no discernible impact on the
policymaking process?
In applying the competing theories of the
impact of divided government at the national level to the states, several
issues were raised. First, the use of quantitative measures of the
impact of divided government was found to be problematic. The focus
on legislative outputs, such as the number of bills passed, masks the
impact of divided government at earlier stages in the policy making
process.
If governors seek to maximize their success through
anticipating the reactions of the legisiature, then there should be little
or no difference in the number of bills passed by the legislature. This
study first analyzed quantitative measures of outcomes under divided
government at the state level similar to those used at the national level
by Mayhew and Fiorina. It then shifted the focus to an earlier stage of
the policy process , agenda setting , using a more qualitative approach.
56 I The Journal of PoliticalScience

GubernatorialAgenda
Divided government helps to explain a governor's choice of
strategy in agenda setting, influencing whether he will work primarily
within the system or go public. However, a combination of other
factors also affect the agenda setting process. Through the use of
interviews, this study has been able to pinpoint the resources that
governors in different political contexts consider important.
According to Light's study of presidential agenda setting,
political factors are the most important in agenda setting. In applying
Light's theoretical framework at the state level, the key difference
between governors in divided versus unified government is the amount
and the source of their political capital.
Table 5 summarizes the political capital of the four governors
included in this study. The major difference between the governors is
party support. The two governors from states with unified government,
Miller (D-GA) and McWherter (D-TN), were both elected with
overwhelming Democratic majorities in the state legislature. In
contrast, the two governors from states with divided government,
Fordice (R-MS) and Campbell (R-SC), were both elected with a small
minority of the seats in the legislature held by their party .
The governors also differ in the amount of public support each
has had over time (See Table 5).
In the states with unified
government, Miller (D-GA) has had an average of 45 % positive
approval rating and McWherter (D-TN) has had an average of 50%.
In contrast, both governor's from divided government have sustained
higher positive approval ratings. Fordice's average approval rating has
been 56%, with a high of72 %, and Campbell's has been 64%, with a
high of 75 %. Realizing that they did not have a base of party support
to rely on, both the governors from divided government states have
tried to use public support to increase their influence.
Their
substantially higher approval ratings reflect the efforts that they have
made to cultivate public support.
Differences in the source and amount of political capital help
to explain the strategies the four governors have used in agenda setting.
In setting the agenda, governors tend to emphasize one of two basic
strategies: 1) working inside the system, appealing to party members
for support, or 2) working outside the system, basically going over the
heads of legislators to the public for support. To maximize success,
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Table 5: The Political Capital of Selected Governors
Prior Experience

Electoral Outcome

Public Support

Zell Miller (D-GA)

Academic, Business

governor won 53%

1991-1994

GAU Gov., 1974- 1990

80% Dem. maj. in House

high 54%

83% Dern. maj. in Senate

low40%

(Average)
45%

Ned McWherter (D-TN)

Business

governor won 54%

1987-1994

TN House, 1969-1986

63% Dem. maj. in House

high64%

(Speaker, 1972-1986)

70% Dem. rnaj. in Senate

low40%

Business

governor won 51 %

Kirk Fordice (R-MS)
1992-1995

50%

56%

15% Rep. min. in House

high 72%

17% Rep. min. in Senate

low42%

Carroll Campbell (D-SC)

Business

governor won 51 %

1987-1994

SC House, 1970-1974

26% Rep. min. in House

high 75%

SC Senate, 1976-1978

20% Rep. min. in Senate

low59%

64%

U.S. House, 1978-1986

Source: Compiled by author

governors will employ both strategi es. Going public is not necessarily
incompatible with bargaining.
Howev er, whether or not there is
divided government influence s which of the two strategies will be the
primary focus of the governor. In this study , the two governor s under
unified government have relied on the first strategy , while the two
governor s under divided government have emphasized the second
strategy.
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The strategy a governor uses, whether he will make primarily
a party appeal or a public appeal, depends on the major source of his
political capital. While certainly all governors appeal to both their
party and the public for support, when the governor's party controls
only a small minority of the seats within the legislature, public support
takes on a much greater importance. Conversely, when the governor
has substantial party support, public support is important, but not as
necessary.
In addition to the basic type of strategy that a governor will
use in agenda setting, governors have different styles. The styles range
from confrontational to conciliatory and reflect the governor's
personality and background to a greater extent than the political context
of divided or unified government. In the two states with unified
government, both McWherter and Miller have extensive prior 'political
experience and have used the same strategy of pursuing an agenda that
attracts their party support. Yet these two governors have very
different styles. Miller tends to be confrontational. He sets his agenda
and then pressures legislators to support him. He pursues issues that
have both legislative and public support, so he can afford to be
confrontational without jeopardizing his party support. On the other
hand, McWherter tends to be very conciliatory. He has mastered the
art of consensus building and avoids confrontation whenever possible.
For the most part, he only pursues issues that have developed enough
support to achieve success.
In the states with divided government, Campbell and Fordice
have both pursued going public strategies. However, their styles are
also very different. As a professional politician, Campbell understands
when he needs to be confrontational and when he needs to be
conciliatory.
He believes that as a Republican governor in a
Democratic state, he has to be somewhat confrontational. But in the
end, Campbell is always willing to work with Democrats and
compromise to achieve his goals. In contrast, as an amateur politician,
Fordice has been more confrontational in his approach. He is less
willing to compromise and even appears somewhat frustrated by the
political process. He has learned while serving as governor, however,
and over time his style has become more similar to that of Campbell.
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In conclu sion , although divided government does not produce
gridlock or stalemate at the state level , it is not without impact on
governing . Divided government affects the strategy that a governor
uses in setting the agenda . With party support as a source of political
capital , a governor is likely to work within the legislature and appeal
to his party for support . Without party support to count on, a governor
is likely to put more emphasis on obtaining public support for his
agenda. Whether a governor is more conciliatory or confrontational,
however , reflects his personality and his prior experience.
Gubernatorial agenda setting is best explained by the interaction
between a variety of personal and political factors.

Laura van Assendelft is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Mary Baldwin College. Her research interests in state and local
politics focus on the impact of divided government on policymaking.
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